Open Access

ARTICLE

Stackelberg Game-Based Resource Allocation with Blockchain for Cold-Chain Logistics System

by Yang Zhang¹, Chaoyang Li^2,*, Xiangjun Xin²

1 College of Food and Bioengineering, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou, 450002, China
2 College of Software Engineering, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou, 450002, China

* Corresponding Author: Chaoyang Li. Email:

Computers, Materials & Continua 2023, 75(2), 2429-2442. https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2023.037139

Received 08 November 2022; Accepted 29 December 2022; Issue published 31 March 2023

Abstract

Cold-chain logistics system (CCLS) plays the role of collecting and managing the logistics data of frozen food. However, there always exist problems of information loss, data tampering, and privacy leakage in traditional centralized systems, which influence frozen food security and people’s health. The centralized management form impedes the development of the cold-chain logistics industry and weakens logistics data availability. This paper first introduces a distributed CCLS based on blockchain technology to solve the centralized management problem. This system aggregates the production base, storage, transport, detection, processing, and consumer to form a cold-chain logistics union. The blockchain ledger guarantees that the logistics data cannot be tampered with and establishes a traceability mechanism for food safety incidents. Meanwhile, to improve the value of logistics data, a Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model has been proposed between the logistics data resource provider and the consumer. The competition between resource price and volume balances the resource supplement and consumption. This model can help to achieve an optimal resource price when the Stackelberg game obtains Nash equilibrium. The two participants also can maximize their revenues with the optimal resource price and volume by utilizing the backward induction method. Then, the performance evaluations of transaction throughput and latency show that the proposed distributed CCLS is more secure and stable. The simulations about the variation trend of data price and amount, optimal benefits, and total benefits comparison of different forms show that the resource allocation model is more efficient and practical. Moreover, the blockchain-based CCLS and Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model also can promote the value of logistic data and improve social benefits.

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Keywords

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